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An optimal control macroeconomic model of the Iranian economy is developed in 
order to evaluate the government's economic policies over the 1972-77 period. 
The main results of the study indicate that, after 1973, Iranian planners should have 
focused on shorter-run stabilization issues and contributed more actively to the . 
budgetary decision-making process. This conclusion is true with regard not only to , 
the longer-run supply effects of the government's programmes, but also to the 
shorter-run stabilization difficulties posed by the rapidly accelerating level of 
expenditures. 
Keywords: Iran; Optimal control; Middle East economies 
In order to examine the consequences of the 
increased oil revenues, a number of forecasting 
models were developed in Iran after 1973. The 
econometric models developed at the Iranian Plan 
and Budget Organization were designed with the 
premise that: 1 
. . . oil revenues may well be a mixed blessing, depending 
on the size of the annual liquidity injections relative to the 
availability of complementary factors of production. 
Indeed, these revenues are on the one hand like the blood of 
the economy carrying badly needed investment r~sources to 
particular areas for purposes of expanding productive 
capacity and on the other they are capable of producing an 
excessive liquidity situation, if capital resources become 
suddenly out of line with other complementary factors of 
production (such as skilled labor, technology, organiza-
tional skills, natural resources or general infrastructure 
services). This duality renders the planning task all the more 
difficult under conditions of financial surplus, since it 
requires a shift of emphasis in the planning circles, from an 
The author is Associate Professor of National Security 
Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93953, 
USA. 
Final manuscript received 21February1985. 
allocation of resources according to the now abundant 
factor to an allocation of resources according to the real 
scarce factor. 
Using these models for forecasting over a 20-year 
period, several important difficulties associated with 
the country's development were identified. 2 
(i) The prospect of a recession during the period 
1980--87. 
(ii) The existence of impending difficulties in 
ad justing from oil induced growth to con-
sumption induced growth. 
(iii) High inflation anticipated during the decade 
1972-82, as well as a highly uneven impact on 
various social and economic groups. 
(iv) The need to identify areas of comparative 
advantage in the industrial and mining sectors. 
( v) The prospect of a serious balance of payments 
disequilibrium beginning around 1987. 
(vi) The prospect of an unusual widening of 
urban-rural income disparities with little hope 
of a self-adjusting mechanism. 
1Vakil [10], pp 715-716. 
2Planometrics Bureau [7], p 89. 
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(vii) Identification of the correct role of the public 
sector in a mixed enterprise economy under-
going rapid change. 
Interestingly enough, when this particular forecast 
was tested for the sensitivity of these results to 
increases in government revenues, it was found that a 
4.4% increase in revenues spread over 20 years 
(1972-92) did not have a significant impact in terms of 
the endogenous variables. Also apparent was that an 
increase in oil revenues without any correcting policy 
considerations contributed to urban-rural income 
disparities. Out of this analysis several scenarios were 
drawn. 
The basic policy problems brought to light by the 
initial forecasts were therefore that: (i) a do-nothing 
approach to urban-rural disparities would not bring 
out a self-adjusting mechanism (and therefore some-
thing needed to be done); (ii) the level of disparities 
implied by the do-nothing approach was such that the 
social fabric would be able to withstand it only under 
a very tight control situation; (iii) the disparities 
would encourage rural-urban migration at a rate 
which might be untenable given the existing amount 
of urban infrastructure; (iv) for a more balanced 
society more acceptable targets had to be set even if 
the effect of such targets were reduced growth and 
increased inflation. 3 
Thus on the argument that oil was a depletable 
resource and that its wealth must be conserved in 
financial terms to serve future generations, a 
spending policy was derived. A number of simula-
tions of the economy were made to determine if it was 
possible to: 
(i) avoid the forecasted recessions of 135~6; 
(ii) extend the protective financial umbrella of oil 
based resource out in time; 
(iii) smooth out Iran's growth path over the next 20 
years; 
(iv) avoid excessive inflationary pressures in the 
initial years; 
(v) avoid exceeding the absorptive capacity of 
investment; 
(vi) solve the anticipated balance of payments 
crisis of 1366-71; 
(vii) leave future generations beyond 1371 with a 
certain size of capital stock. 
In general these were found to be compatible goals 
and a number of policy recommendations4 were made 
on the basis of the Plan and Budget Organization's 
econometric model and forecasts. 
3Planometrics Bureau [7], pp 58-59. 
4Planometrics Bureau [7], pp 69-93. 
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The use of econometric models for quantitative 
analysis of macroeconomic policy was thus a major 
development in Iranian planning. Using these 
econometric models it was possible for planners to 
make projections of key economic variables. Given a 
set of proposed future values for the policy variables 
or instruments at the government's disposal, planners 
were then able to examine the nature of these pro-
jections in order to evaluate policy proposals. While a 
productive start in the right direction, this approach 
to policy analysis was deficient for two reasons. 
First, the dynamic response of the economic vari-
ables to a particular course assigned to the policy was 
complicated ,and unpredictable. The selection of 
policy by a trial and error process was therefore 
extremely inefficient. What was needed was the 
specification of a loss functioll of the key economic 
variables and the minimization of its value with 
respect to the policy instruments included in the 
model. The specification of an objective or loss 
function and the derivation of a policy solution by 
optimization would have given the planners a much 
clearer picture of the extent to which the country'~ 
economic performance could have .been improved 
upon. There was no assurance that the trial and error 
methods actually used came anywhere close to fore-
casting the economy's optimal growth path. 
The second and perhaps more important deficiency 
stemmed from the uncertainty inherent in the projec-
tions; ie given the proposed time paths for the policy 
variables, it is impossible to rely on an econometric 
model to make perfect predictions of the values 
important economic variables should assume. Uncer-
tainty not only makes it difficult to evaluate a given 
policy path, but it makes the evaluation of such a path 
unrealistic and irrelevant. 5 
The former difficulty can be resolved by stochastic 
simulations which incorporate random elements in 
the econometric model in making projections; the 
means and variances of the future paths can then be 
calculated. Because of uncertainty in the economy, it 
would have been unrealistic to expect the govern-
ment to adhere to a fixed plan irrespective of future 
developments; ie future decisions were made on the 
basis of future observations of the economy. Hence, 
it was unrealistic and irrelevant for the Plan and 
Budget Organization to evaluate the consequences of 
a preassigned sequence of policy actions. A more 
realistic policy would have taken the form of a 
reaction function, or a feedback control equation 
permitting the values of the policy variables to be 
determined according to future economic obser-
vations. 
5Chow [2], p 341. 
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In sum the policy analysis at this time not only 
lacked optimization but it was also not conducted in a 
setting capable of yielding feedback as to the impact 
of policy actions. It is puzzling why several of the 
more sophisticated and insightful mathematical 
models available at the time were not used. In parti-
cular since the Plan and Budget Organization's 
econometric models were linear with an additive 
random disturbance, it would have been best to 
minimize the expected value of a quadratic loss 
function for T periods according to the methods 
developed some time earlier by Herbert Simon [8] 
and Henri Theil;6 that of optimal control. 
Method of optimal control 
An optimal control consists of: 
(i) a set of differential or difference equations 
that represent a system that is to be controlled; 
(ii) a set of constraints on the variables of the 
system; 
(iii) a set of boundary conditions on the variables: 
and 
(iv) cost functional or performance index which is 
to be minimized. 
The essential idea of optimal control' is precisely to 
derive the optimal policy in order to steer the 
economy to a specified set of targets. A necessary step 
in this regard is to specify an objective function or a 
welfare loss function by which the outcome associ-
ated with the optimal policy or its alternatives can be 
evaluated. Given this welfare loss function and a 
dynamic model, a policy sequence can be found 
minimizing the expectation of the welfare loss for a 
given time horizon. 
For example, the solution to the optimal control 
problem with unknown parameters using a quadratic 
loss function can be written as: 
y(t) = A(t)y(t + 1) + C(t) x (t) + b(t) + uJ..t) (1) 
y(t) is a vector of endogenous variables at time t; x(t) 
is a vector of policy variables at time t; b(t) is a vector 
combining the effects of all exogenous variables not 
subject to control, the matrices A(t), C(t) and b(t) 
consist of unknown parameters whose probability 
distribution is assumed to be given, and u(t) is a 
vector of random disturbances having mean 0, covari-
ance matrix V, and being serially uncorrelated. 
Endogenous variables and policy variables with 
higher order lags can be eliminated by defining new 
"Theil [9], pp 346-349. 
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endogenous variables so as to retain the form (1) of a 
system of first-order linear stochastic difference 
equations in which only the current control variables 
x(t) appear. We can include the policy variables in the 
vector y(t) so that x(t) need not be an argument of the 
loss function. 7 
The loss function mentioned above can be depicted 
as: 
T 
W = 2: (yt - at) 1 K, (yt - at) (2) 
l=l 
where a(t) is a vector of targets for the variables y(t) 
and K(t) is ~ diagonal matrix giving the relative 
penalties for the squared deviations of the various 
variables from their targets. The problem becomes 
essentially one of minimizing the expected value of 
the loss function for T periods by choosing a strategy 
for x(l), x(2) ... x(T). The control variables will be 
selected sequentially, the vector x(t) for each period 
being determined only after the up-to-date informa-
tion is available. This information consists mainly of 
y(t - 1) which includes the observations of all past' 
endogenous variables and policy variables affecting 
the current endogenous variables at time (t). 
It may be argued that decisions of the planners in 
Iran, particularly after the oil price increases, were 
not made in a context of marginal optimization. How-
ever, the manner in which the planning authorities 
approached their responsibilities can be approxi-
mated by the optimization of a well defined objective 
function. After all, the responsible officials on the 
regime's High Economic Council were all reasonably 
knowledgeable men and concerned with national 
income, the price level, the balance of payments and 
so on. Clearly a deviation between actual develop-
ments and the desired ones in any of these aspects can 
be regarded as having caused disutility to this group. 
The application of optimal control to the problem 
of planning a development strategy after 1972 is 
presented below. 8 The approach is straightforward. 
The economic system is represented by an econo-
metric model-namely a set of difference equations. 
There are constraints; for example inflation is not 
allowed to increase over a certain rate. The boundary 
conditions are the initial values of the variables while 
real non-oil GDP is maximized for 1980 in the objec-
tive function. 
7 A complete description is given in G. C. Chow [1]. 
8lt should be noted that the nature of the problem dealt with here is 
one of short-run stabilization over a period with known exogenous 
variables. For a longer-run forecast of the economy using an 
optimal approach see Homa Motamen [6]. 
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A model of the Iranian economy KPL = TINP + TIN PL + TINPL2 (3) 
The model consists of a series of identities and 
estimated questions. For clarity a rough outline 
(Table 1) shows the major relationships. '!'he m~el 
incorporates a foreign sector, the domestic bankmg 
system, the government, and the private sector (the 
basic identities of each are depicted in Equations 
(1)-(4), Table 1, respectively). 
Each of the first three sectors involve income as 
well as financial transactions whereas the income 
transactions of the banking system are considered to 
be negligible. An increase in the deficit or a reducti~n 
in the non-financial net savings is assumed to result 10 
either an increase in its financial liabilities or a 
decrease in its holdings of financial assets or both. 
Furthermore, given its non-financial asset only at the 
expense of accumulations to its holdings or one or 
more alternative financial assets or in exchange for 
increases in one or more financial liabilities. 9 The 
account for each sector is assumed balanced at the 
end of the year. The model therefore contains a set of 
sectoral balance sheet constraints. As usual in models 
of this type, certain behaviour relations are required 
to explain the economic and financial activities of 
various sectors. 
The model's construction was constrained by lack 
of data on several variables. In particular, there are 
no figures on private savings or the capital stock. As 
an approximation the capital stock was simply 
assumed to be a summation of the total gross 
domestic capital formation in the current and two 
prior years: 
Table 1. Iran: a macroeconomic framework. 
Equation Structural specification 
(1) f:J.MSFAP = EXR - ZNP + GFP + PFP 
(2) f:J. MZP = f:J. MSFAP + f:J. MSDCP 
(3) f:J. MSGCP = GCNP + GITP- GREUP - GFP- f:J. GB 
(4) PITP = SP+ f:J. PCP+ PFP - f:J. M2P - f:J. B 
(5) f:J. PCP = f:J. MSDCP - f:J. GCP 
(6) SP= NOXNP - NOREUP - PCNP 
(7) KP = KPL + PITP + GITP - DEP 
(7') KP = TINP + TINPL + TINPLZ 
(8) NOXNP = KP + L 
(9) P = EXCESS + EUUICA 
(10) MIP = NOXNP + INF 
(11) MZ = BMRM 
(12) ZNP = PC + PTINP + f:J. WP/ 
(13) NOREUP = PENANP 
(14) PCNP = NOXNP - f:J. CPI 
(15) EXPECTNA = EUUCP + CCP 
(16) GEXPTNAP = GREUP 
Note: See text for description of symbols. 
"For a detailed discussion of these assumptions, see C. H. Wong 
and 0. Pettersen [ 11]. 
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where TINP + PITP - GITP (total private invest-
ment plus total government investment). 
For convenience, non-oil GDP (Equation (8)) is 
specified in linear form in the optimum control 
exercises. Both the real capital (KP) stock and labour 
force (L) were assumed to make independent contri-
butions to real non-oil (NOXNP) output. 
The price level (Equation (9)) was assumed to 
reflect both excess real demand, monetary factors 
and world prices. Excess demand is measured as t~e 
ratio of liquidity to real output (MINOXNP), while 
the export price index of the developed countries 
(EUVICA) was used as an approximation of world 
price trends. Since specification for the price level 
incorporates a disequilibrium relationship, it is easily 
converted into an inflation equation for empirical 
estimation. As noted earlier import prices are an 
important determinant of domestic prices. As formu-
lated here, an increase in import prices may cause 
upward pressure on domestic prices mainly through 
their effect on: (i) the costs of production; and (ii) the 
substitution of domestic for importec.I goods (which 
creates demand pressure on domestic resources). 
The demand for liquidity (Equation (10) simply 
states that the transaction demand (depicted by real 
non-oil GDP) as reinforced by the rate of inflation (or 
requirement for additional cash to finance expe~di­
tures during periods of price increases) determmes 
desired real money (M/P) holdings. 
The positive sign for inflation reflects the lack of 
attractive non-financial assets that the public could 
acquire during this period as the opportunity cost. of 
holding money increased10 (due to the pnce 
increases). 
Imports (Equation (12)) are assumed to be related 
largely to the importation of machinery both by the 
public (PIMP) and the government (GIMP). This 
view of imports (ZNP) accepts the two gap theory 
assumptions that given the nature of Iran's import 
substitution strategy and the lack of a domestic 
capital goods industry, the country required a certain 
minimal amount of imports just to maintain a given 
level of income. The change in wholesale prices 
obviously indicates a shift away from domestic 
producers to cheaper foreign suppliers (of non-
machinery goods) as local price increase. 
The limited non-oil government revenues 
(Equation (13)) were largely duties of one sort or 
another, plus the income tax. They are assumed 
largely a function of private expenditure ( P ENANP). 
Private consumption (Equation (14)) is a function 
10Cf Galbis [ 4] for an empirical test of this assumption. 
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of real non-oil output. Consumption was also 
assumed to be affected by government activity 
whereby stepped-up government purchases may pre-
empt a certain amount of expenditures, either 
through a forced savings mechanism or 'crowding 
out' effect through tightening of credit availability. 11 
Exports (Equation (15)) are largely a function of 
crude petroleum production ( CCP) and the price of 
oil in world markets (depicted by the export price of 
oil EUVCP). Non-oil exports were largely disre-
garded (but are included in EXPTNA). 
The main characteristics of the model include: (i) 
integration of the domestic economy with that of the 
world economic system; (ii) an active role played by 
both the banking system and government; (iii) the use 
of non-oil output and the rate of inflation as the 
optimal conf!ol targets; (iv) the adaptation of 
changes in the private banking system; and (v) 
government investment in machinery as the control 
variable. 12 
The major objective in formulating an optimal 
control simulation of the economy for the 1972-77 
period is to examine whether and to what extent the 
government's stabilization programme could have 
been more successful in controlling inflation while at 
the same time less disruptive on the private sector 
than was actually the case. · 
The main tasks in formulation of the simulation 
were: were (i) estimating the structural equations; (ii) 
establishing desirable endpoint (1977) targets (level 
of real non-oil GDP, inflation); and (iii) estimating 
the required levels of the policy instruments year-by-
year to attain these targets (with inflation treated as 
the welfare loss function). 
The results of the econometric two-stage estima-
tion of the structural equations (Table 2) are 
encouraging and need little further comment. The 
equations used in the actual stimulations are the first 
one listed for each variable (while the primed equa-
tions for each were alternates and are included here 
because the depict an interesting aspeat of the 
variable). 
The optimal control steps involved: 
(i) Setting the values for the exogenous variables 
at their historical values (exogenous variables 
were: (a) CPP-index of crude petroleum pro-
11 An example of this mechanism and related ones for another 
country is described in E. V. K. Fitzgerald [3]. 
12Government capital expenditure is probably a more effective tool 
than consumption in the Iranian context because consumption was 
undoubtedly less amenable to control. Moreover, government 
capital expenditure not only constitutes a component in the 
aggregate demand, but enabled the economy to mitigate demand 
pressure. 
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duction; (b) EUVIC export price index indus-
trial countries; (c) £UV-Iranian export priced 
index, and ( d) lagged variables in the estimated 
equations. 
(ii) With (i) simulating values for the endogenous 
variables over the 1972-77 period. 
(iii) Setting two values for 1977 for real non-oil 
GDP (NOXNP) to be optimised (Rials 1650 
billion and Rials 1800 billion as opposed to the 
actual historical figure of Rials 1453.8 billion). 
(iv) Simultaneously the rate of increase of the 
consumer price index was set at equal or less 
than 10% per annum for the 1971-77 period as 
a whol~ (the historical rate was 13.54% ). 
( v) Two instrument variables, government invest-
ment in machinery (GIMP) private credit 
from the banking systein (PCP), were selected 
for control purposes. 
(vi) No constraints were placed on government 
investment in machinery or private consump-
tion although this could be introduced with no 
problem once a basis for their lower limit was 
established. 
Logically, four policy variables could oe chosen in the 
context of the stabilization model outlined above. In 
addition to the change in net domestic credit (private 
sector) of the banking system and government capital 
expenditure, government construction and govern-
ment consumption expenditures were possible instru-
ments of fiscal policy. Regardless of their choice the 
policy instruments included in the model must be well 
coordinated since the various sectors are interacting 
with one another. It can be seen from the simulation 
model that for instance a change in the rate of credit 
expansion would influence foreign reserves, output 
and prices through imports and investment. The 
change in output would also have an effect on imports 
and tax revenues and hence the balance of payments 
and the budget of the government. At the same time 
the change in credit and domestic liquidity through a 
change in the demand for money resulting from the 
changes in real income and in domestic credit crea-
tion would have affected imports and thus investment 
and the rate of growth. 
Assessment of results 
The results (Table 3) of the optimal control exercise 
were very satisfactory in that they confirmed the fol-
lowing facts concerning economic policy in Iran 
during the 1970s: 
(i) Both government investment in machinery 
(total government investment could have been 
used as a policy variable just as easily} and 
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Table2. Iran: macroeconomic simulation model (two-stage least sources estimates). 
Equation 
Non-oil GDP (constant price) 
~ (1) NOXNP 0.91KP + 0.04L 132.22 
.;. (10.78) (2.06) ( - 0.89) r2 = 0.997 
F = 1S41.73 
(la) NOXNP 4.86PIMP + 4.46GIMP 1S.50TIME + 140.0S 
(S.11) (3.85) (2.27) (3.71) r2 = 0.990 
F = 281.06 
(lb) NOXNP 0.94KP + 7.41TIME + 130.6S 
(12.83) (1.90) (7.19) r2 = 0.9970 
F = 1490.81 
(le) NOXNP 0.89KP + 0.013POP 134.4S 
(10.04) (2.lS) ( - 0.98) r2 = 0.997 
F = 1628.99 
(ld) NOXNP 1.07KP 14.39ICOR + 198.96 
(62.0S) ( - 2.66) (lS.99)' r2 = 0.998 
F = 1932.27 
Private consumption (constant price) 
(2) PCNP 0.64NOXNP - 1.62ACPI + S9.08 
(20.S7) ( - 2.67) (4.60) r2 = 0.99S 
F = 192.64 
(2•) PCNP 0.69NOXNP - 0.14GENANP + S2.18 
(9.42) ( - 2.30) (2.67) r2 = 0.994 
F = 734.28 
Private expenditures 
(3) PENANP 0.2SNOXNP + 1.SlPCP + 14S.4S 
(2.29) (3.30) (4.33) r2 = 0.997 
F = 44S.SS 
Total savings 
(4) FSNP 1.09EXR 28.73 
(68.79) ( - 6.49) r2 = 0.9981 
F = 4731.42 
Private investment in machinery 
(S) PIMP 0.32ANOXNP + 0.llPCPL o.n 
(2.85) (1.78) ( - 0.21) r2 = 0.939 
F = 61.61 
(Sa) PIMP 0.82AM1P + 0.25ANOXNP + 4.88 
(3.S6) (3.21) (1.99) r2 = 0.967 
F = 117.74 
(Sb) PIMP 0.16ANOXNP + O.S3AM2P + 4.86 
(2.26) (S.04) (2.SS) r2 = 0.980 
F = 192.64 
Private investment in construction 
(6) PICP = 0.16AGENANP + 0.52APCP + 18.27 
(9.19) (7.14) (11.61) r2 = 0.96S 
= 0.06AGENANP -t 
F = 111.49 
(6a) PICP 0.14PCP + 13.13 
(2.84) (8.SS) (7.28) r2 = 0.97S 
F = 1S4.69 
(6b) PICP 0.06GENANP + 0.13ANOXNP + 14.S2 
(4.06) (3.S2) (3.98) r2 = 0.983 
F = 229.61 
Government consumption 
(7) GCNP O.lSGREVP + O.SOGREVPL - 6.19 
(8.S4) (17.S3) ( - 1.73) r2 = 0.998 
F = 2098.63 
(7a) GCNP 1.06GREVPL + 0.36GDEFP - 6.87 
(24.62) (3.68) ( - 0.93) r2 = 0.992 
F = SS3.81 
Government investment in machinery 
(8) GZMP - 0.28GDEFP + O.llGREUP - 2.18 
( - 4.39) (10.18) ( - 0.66) r2 = 0.9Sl 
F = 78.0S 
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t Table2. Iran: macroeconomic simulation model (two-stage least sources estimates) (continued). 
Equation 
Government investment in construction 
• (9) GICP - 0.66GDEFP + 0.24GREUP - 1.87 
( - 5.00) (10.80) ( - 0.28) ,,,. = 0.954 
-
F = 83.40 
Total government investment 
(10) GTTP 0.31GREVPL + 0.43GREVPL2 - 8.48 
(1.75) (1.83) ( - 1.25) ,,,. = 0.970 
F = 127.92 
Imports 
(11) ZNP 0.12PCP + 0.01EXW + 8.39 
(4.57) (2.80) (0.64) ,,,. = 0.970 
F = 128.59 
(lla) ZNP · 0.86PCP + 0.28BMFAP + 6.63 ~ 
(12.23) (5.10) (0.78) ,,,. = 0.986 
F = 281.10 
(llb) ZNP 1.49PIMP + 2.860/MP + 63.48DFWPA 
(5.47) (9.06) (1.85) ,,,. = 0.9953 
F = 556.98 
Exports (deftated with export deftator) 
(12) EXR 0.42VAG + 1.31EUVP 7.44 
(35.44) (7.73) ( - 0.74) ,,,. = 0.998 
F = 1994.38 
(12a) EXR 0.26VAD + 6.83RUVICA - 249.35 
(8.28) (7.21) ( - 5.70) ,,,. = 0.997 
F ""1764.29 
Exports (deftated with world price deftator) 
(13) EXW 0.95VAD · + 2.91EUVP 17.14 
(35.54) (7.77) ( - 0.75) ,,,. = 0.998 
F = 2007.05 
(13a) EXW 0.60VAO + 15.53EUVICA - 567.29 
(8.29) (7.22) ( - 5.72) ,,,. = 0.998 
F = 1768.33 
(13b) EXW = 12.83EUVICA + 0.66EXPTNA - 453.87 
(6.12) (9.74) ( - 4.75) ,,,. 
F 
Exports (current price) 
(14) EXPTNA 1.04VAO + 15.94 
(86.69) (2.75) ,,,. = 0.9988 
F = 7515.16 
(14a) EXPTNA 3.95EUVCP + 14.22CPP 280.66 
(4.95) (13.85) ( - 5.94) ,,,. 
F 
Private sector credit from banking system 
(15) PCP = 0.88BMRMP + 0.41PCPL + 1.98 
(2.91) • (1.96) (0.44) ,,,. = 0.994 
F = 612.70 
(15a) PCP = 0.39ll.NONXNP + 0.91PCPL + 0.68 
(2.48) (10.92) (0.14) ,,,. = 0.992 
F = 525.35 
PC (current price) 
(16) PC 2.10BMRMP - 58.60 
(26.41) ( - 5.76) ,,,. = 0.986 
F = 697.54 
(16a) PC l.12BMRM + 0.15NOXNP - 38.22 
(16.75) (5.16) ( - 4.23) ,,,. = 0.999 
F ~ 4232.63 
Balance of payments current account (current price) 
(17) CURE 0.41EXW 13.74 
(26.63) ( - 1.39) ,,,. = 0.986 
F = 708.99 
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Table 2. Iran: macroeconomic simulation model (two-stage least sources estimates) (continued). 
Equation 
CUREP (constant price) 
(18) CU REP 0.47EXWL 23.82 
(27.56) ( - 3.69) 
Government oil revenues 
,;, 
(19) OREVP l.llEUVP + 7.06CPP , -
(15.28) (80.55) 
(19a) OREVP 0.46VAO + 5.38 
(22.99) (0.56) 
(19b) OREVP 5.86CPP + l3.82CPPL 
(7.73) (2.86) 
Government non-oil revenues 
(20) NOREVP 0.17PENANP - 16.38 
(17.23) ( - 3.27) 
(20a) NOREVP 0.20PENANP - l.50/NFC 
(15.08) ( - 3.12) 
Government deficit 
(21) GDEFP l.07CUREP + 0.68GREUP -
( - 5.10) ( - 6.34) 
Bank Markazi revenue money 
(22) BMRM (current price) 
BMRM 0.64GENANP - 9.99 
(17.21) ( - 1.07) 
Bank Markazi reserve money (constant price) 
(23) BMRMP 0.04EXR + 0.27PENANP -
Bank Markazi net foreign assets 
(24) BMRMFAP 0.5(J)REUP 
(14.89) 
Supply of narrow money (current price) 
0.227NP 
( - 2.54) 
(25) Ml l.09BMRM + 16.15 
(65.26) (6.31) 
Supply of broad money (current price) 
(26) M2 2.34BMRM 
Demand for narrow money 
(27) MlP 


















( - 3.58) 
27.74 
( - 5.45) 
12.40 
( - 1.61) 
45.71 




( - 2.44) 
84.75 
( - 11.51) 
(29) BMCP 2.22BMCPL + 0.05GENANP 16.83 
(2.08) (1.64) (2.85) 
r2 = 0.987 
F = 759.72 
r2 = 0.999 
F = 6688.93 
r2 = 0.983 
F = 528.33 
r2 = 0.9911 
F = 444.23 
r2 = 0.971 
F = 297.03 
r2 = 0.987 
F = 298.55 
r2 = 0.926 
F ·= 50.28 
r2 = 0.971 
F = 296.08 
r2 
F 
r2 = 0.990 
F = 411.68 
r2 = 0.998 
F = 4258.5 
r2 = 0.997 
F = 3069.47 
r2 = 0.991 
F = 442.44 
r2 = 0.998 
F = 2014.39 
r2 = 0.833 
F = 22.46 
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Table2. Iran: macroeconomic simulation model (two-stage least sources estimates) (continued). 
Equation 
! Value added by oil sector 
(30) VAO 14.23CPP + 3.29EUVCP 263.02 
(15.14) (4.51) ( - 6.00) r2 = 0.986 
F = 273.39 
(30a) VAO 3.91CPP + 2.06VAOL 136.83 
(1.92) (6.61) ( - 7.46) r2 = 0.992 
F = 501.79 
Wholesale price index 
(31) WP/ = 193.82EXCESSA + 0.06M2L + 66.08 
(3.17) (2.16) (6.94) r2 = 0.987 
F = 342.70 
(31a) WP/ = 183.llEXCES:SA + 0.13M1L .+ 65.39 
(2.95) (2.30) (7.53) y r2 = 0.988 
F = 359.08 
Consumer price index 
(32) CPI = 87.92EXC£SSD + 0.21M1L + 101.75 
(2.79) (7.12) (87.50) r2 = 0.994 
F = 729.60 
(32a) CPI 0.07M2L + 0.69EUVICA + 81.09 
(4.69) (4.22) (14.08) r2 = 0.995 
F = 960.92 
(32b) CPI 0.07M2L + 1.18EUVICAL + 59.45 
(4.61) (4.74) (5.98) r2 = 0.996 
F = 1085.03 
Wholesale price inflation 
(33) TNFW 0.19GM2L + 0.33GM2L2 + 0.35WINF 6.54 
(2.51) ' ' (2.97) (4.06) ( - 4.08) r2 = 0.903 
F = 31.78 
Consumer price inflation 
(34) /NFC = 17.94EXCESSD + 105.74EXCESSDL + 0.18WINF 1.18 
(2.65) (12.42) (2.11) ( - 1.40) r2 = 0.995 
F = 71~14 
Excess demand (Ml/NOXNP) 
(35) EXCESSA 0.00078M2L - 0.0003NOXNPL + 0.22 
(7.76) ( - 3.65) (11.23) r2 = 0.984 
F = 267.43 
Excess demand (/M2/NOXNP) 
(36) EXCESSD 0.0012~Ml + 0.00028~ GENANP + 0.00067~PCP + 0.026 
(10.52) (2.40) (4.34) (4.02) r2 = 0.995 
F = 478.83 
Agriculture sector output 
(37) AGP 0.097NOXNP + 68.81 
(4.58) • (5.53) r2 = 0.678 
F = 21.02 
Manufacturing sector output 
(38) MANP 0.23NOXUP - 25.94 
(31.36) ( - 6.14) r2 = 0.989 
F = 983.71 
Construction sector value added 
(39) CONP 0.038NOXNP + 8.09 
(3.%) (1.46) r2 = 0.610 
F = 15.66 
Value added by water and power sectors 
(40) WPP 0.046NOXNP 10.63 
(31.50) ( - 12.55) r2 = 0.9900 
F = 992.31 
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Table 2. Iran: macroeconomic simulation model (two-stage least sources estimates) (continued). 
Equation 
Value added in transport and communications sectors 
(41) TCP 0.065NOXNP + 8.12 







V aloe added by ownership of dwellings 
(43) ODP 0.052NOXNP + 5.37 
(13.35) (2.38) 
Value added by private services 
(44) PRNP 0.068NOXNP - 6.12 
(12.24) ( - 1.88) 
Value added by public services 
(45) PUBP 0.20NOXNP - 33.79 
(15.17) ( - 4.36) 
Incremental capital-output ratio 
(46) ICOR 14.82GNOXNP + 4.04 
( - 2.88) (7.93) 
Note: See text for description of symbols. 
private credit would have been sufficient in 
obtaining considerably higher rates of real 
non-oil GDP than was actually obtained. 
(ii) The fall in government investment in 
machinery was not excessive in the high 
NOXNP target case (optimal 11), averaging 
24.17% per year increase (1971-77) versus the 
historical rate of 25.67%. However, in redu-
cing non-oil GDP from 1800.0 in 1977 to 
1650.0 would require a drastic fall in govern-
ment investment in machinery (real growth 
falling from 24.17% to 5.38%) and not an 
appreciable reduction in inflation, '10.00% to 
9.77%. 
(iii) Private credit had to bear most of the burden 
in controlling inflation, falling from the actual 
annual rate ofgrowthofl7.87% to7.67% and 
11.82% for the 1650.0 NOXNP and 1800.0 
NOXNP, respectively. The fall in growth was 
needed largely to control the inflation associa-
ted with these rates. 
(iv) The overall importance of the private and 
government sectors was not altered in moving 
from 1453.8 to 1650.0 and 1800.0 NOXNP in 
1977 with the actual increase in real private 
expenditure (PENANP) 15.28%, falling to 
15.24% or in<-Teasing to 17.27% in optimal I 
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r = 0.965 
F = 275.04 
,,. 
= 0.904 
F = 94.24 
,,. 
= 0.947 
F = 178.35 
,,. 
= 0.937 
F = 149.84 
r = 0.958 
F = 229.98 
,,. 
= 0.455 
F = 8.35 
and optimal II, respectively, whereas the 
increase in real government expenditure 
(GENANP) fell from an actual 23.71% to 
21.83% in optimal I or rose to 23.52% in 
optimal II. 
( v) While the overall levels of government and 
private sector expenditures are not altered 
significantly in the optimal paths over their 
actual values, their compositions are with the 
most significant being a shift away from 
private construction (PICP) to private con-
sumption (PCNP) with real private construc-
tion falling from an actual 28. 76% over the 
1971-77 period to 3.78% and 7.04%, respec-
tively, in optimal I and optimal II and PCNP 
increasing from a historical 12.32% to 15.63% 
in optimal I and 17.67% in optimal II. 
More generally (and despite the size and simplicity of 
the econometric model), the experimental results do 
provide at least some crude lessons for stabilization 
policy in Iran. For example, when government con-
sumption and construction expenditures were 
permitted to remain at their desired levels, private 
credit had to be cut back fairly drastically to contain 
inflation within a range of 10% per annum. 
Apparently the lag between money and prices that 
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Table3 . Iran: actual and optimal growth rates, 1971-77 (billion Rials). 
Actual Actual Simulated Actual 
1971 1972 1972 1977 
NOXNP 635.8 735.7 710.6 1453.8 
PCNP 440.6 504.6 496.0 884.9 
PICP 38.l 48.7 43.9 173.6 
PIMP 34.0 57.1 47.9 144.6 
PCP 159.0 195.4 195.4 426.3 
PITP 72.1 105.8 91.8 318.1 
GIMP 29.8 25.8 25.9 117.4 
GICP 66.1 66.1 79.5 314.7 
GCNP 147.2 185.6 185.6 439.8 
GITP 96.0 105.3 105.3 432.1 
ZNP 159.4 195.6 190.5 600.9 
SNP 164.7 214.7 221.2 865.4 
TINP 168.4 211.1 197.2 750.3 
EXR 192.5 226.3 253.8 732.8 
EXW 437.4 514.2 522.3 1665.3 
EXPTNA 240.6 308.5 366.8 1815.2 
RP 439.2 517.5 503.6 2016.7 
MlP 120.4 157.5 145.2 273.6 
M2P 240.6 307.6 284.1 618.7 
BMRMP 102.0 300.2 
BMFAP 37.5 369.7 
Ml 154.93 214.33 207.7 668.0 
/NFC 4.24 6.47 5.70 27.31 
PENANP 512.7 610.2 596.2 1203.1 
GENANP 243.2 290.9 290.9 871.9 
ORE UP 120.7 130.9 138.6 613.4 
NORE UP 80.5 90.8 88.0 219.7 
GDEFP -25.6 -41.9 -54.7· -159.1 
GREUP 201.2 221.9 226.7 833.1 
CPI 136.07 144.88 144.29 290.36 
Note: See text for description of symbols. 
existed in Iran at this time required policy instru-
ments to be applied in strong bursts. 
One might argue that lags were a distinguishing 
factor between monetary and fiscal policy and should 
in practice have determined the proper mix and 
timing of the two. In actuality monetary and fiscal 
policy in Iran were probably not substitutes, but 
complements, and should have been used in com-
bination. 
In any case it is clear why the authorities were 
frustrated in stabilizing the price level. In addition to 
being related to liquidity, inflation was also affected 
by world price trends. There were therefore natural 
limits below which further reductions in the inflation 
rate were not productive. 
The results indicate that the practical design of 
stabilization policies during this time were critically 
dependent on the proper phasing of monetary and 
fiscal policy. It was clearly not just a question of how 
much monetary restraint or fiscal austerity were 
desirable but more importantly at what point in time 
each should have been altered. Fiscal policy appears 
to have operated with short lags and monetary policy 
over a longer period of time. 
Finally, it appears therefore that from what we 
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Optimal I Optimal II Average annual growth 1971-77 
1977 1977 Actual Optimal I Optimal II 
1650.0 1800.0 14.78 17.23 18.94 
1053.0 1169.9 12.32 15.63 17.67 
47.6 57.3 28.76 3.78 7.04 
142.1 151.3 27.29 26.92 28.25 
247.7 310.8 17.87 7.67 11.82 
189.8 208.6 28.07 17.51 19.37 
40.8 109.2 25.67 5.38 24.17 
314.7 314.7 29.70 29.70 29.70 
439.8 439.8 20.01 20.01 20.01 
355.5 355.5 28.49 24.38 24.38 
529.6 578.2 24.25 22.15 23.96 
865.3 865.3 31.85 31.85 .31.85 
545.3 632.5 28.28 21.63 24.68 
854.8 854.8 24.96 28.21 28.21 
1866.8 1866.8 24.96 . 27.36 27.36 
1804.7 1804.7 40.05 39.91 39.91 
1475.1 1691.2 28.92 22.38 25.20 
347.6 390.1 14.66 19.33 21.64 
745.3 842.l 17.05 20.74 23.22 
286.9 317.5 19.71 18.81 20.83 
367.1 358.1 46.43 46.26 45.66 
554.4 601.4 27.58 23.67 25.36 
8.07 8.59 
1200.8 1333.3 15.28 15.24 17.27 
795.3 863.7 23.71 21.83 23.52 
836.9 836.9 31.12 38.09 38.09 
209.7 236.3 18.21 17.30 19.60 
-260.0 -241.1 35.59 47.16 45.32 
1046.5 1073.2 26.72 31.63 32.18 
238.09 241.06 13.47 9.77 10.00 
know of the mechanisms at work in the Iranian 
economy involving the relationships between credit, 
money, and the balance of payments, that although 
having only a limited number of tools at its disposal, 
Bank Markazi, through monitoring reserves and 
controlling private credit, was able to perform all of 
the functions necessary for successful stabilization of 
the economy. 
Conclusions 
Even with the aid of econometric models in the early 
1970s, policy formulation in Iran remained sub-
optimal. A major problem stemmed from the fact 
that all of the models developed for policy-making 
were structured for the analysis of medium- and long-
term problems. Apparently, no short-run models 
existed that systematically accounted for the incor-
porated financial flows stemming from the monetary 
impacts of alternative budgets on inflation. 
The absence of a systematic treatment of the infla-
tionary impacts of domestic expenditures was 
undoubtedly a holdover from the 1960s when 
inflation was not a real problem and growth was the 
primary consideration of policy-makers. At that 
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time, the government's efforts were largely concen-
trated on obtaining the financial resources with which 
to implement their development plans. Foreign 
exchange was relatively scarce, and thus Iran's inter-
national credit worthiness did not permit significant 
capital inflows on a scale capable of creating serious 
inflationary pressures. 
Because the country's decision-makers apparently 
did not have a clear view of the inflationary and 
balance of payments impacts of the government 
budget, stabilization policy after the oil price 
increases continued to be conducted on largely an ad 
hoc intuitive basis as in the past. 
The second problem facing decision-makers (even 
after the development of the large-scale economy-
wide models) was the fact that the means of 
determining what policy was in some sense 'best' 
remained unclear. 13 Part of the problem was that of 
quantifying the objectives of the policy in a precise 
way (assuming that the objectives of the policy were 
indeed known). Because the Plan Organization 
models never incorporated an objective function to 
be maximized, policy-makers and other officials were 
forced (again on an ad hoc basis) to choose among a 
number of feasible scenarios without the knowledge 
of how and if each of these options could be improved 
upon. While computer simulations were in fact often 
used to learn more about the dynamic behaviour of 
the economy and to study the effects of different 
policies on its key variables, they represented an 
extremely inefficient effort in this regard. 
In retrospect it is clear that after 1973 Iranian 
planners should have focused on shorter-run stabili-
zation issues and contributed more actively to the 
budgetary decision-making process. This is true with 
regard not only to the longer-run supply effects of the 
government's programmes but also the shorter-run 
demand and stabilization difficulties posed by the 
rapidly accelerating level of expenditures. 
13 A discussion of this problem for the USA is given in L. R. Klein 
[5]. 
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Secondly, the planners should have clarified more 
precisely the goals of the regime and together with the 
constraints facing the economy developed an objec-
tive cost or utility function for the near term. 
Finally, given that both monetary and fiscal actions 
had a fairly strong impact on the major macro-
economic aggregates, there should have been much 
closer cooperation between the Bank Markazi and 
Treasury. As noted earlier, too much pressure too 
late was placed on the central bank to control 
inflation. 
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